This paper estimates the impact of early retirement on mortality using Dutch administrative micro panel data. An unexpected temporary decrease in the eligibility age for retirement benefits for civil servants is used to instrument the retirement choice. We find that induced early retirement decreased the probability that a man dies within 5 years by 2.6 percentage points. The result is robust to alternative specifications and data selection criteria. 
| INTRODUCTION
Pension reforms under way in many OECD countries increase the eligibility age for pension benefits in order to keep current retirement systems sustainable. However, changes of the eligibility age may not only affect the financial health of pension schemes but also the physical and mental health of plan participants, as well as related health care costs. In many countries, partial and gradual retirement options are unavailable, so that the move from participation to being retired can involve substantial changes in individual time allocation, life style, accident and health risk exposure, and health behaviors. Because such changes can be very heterogeneous in the population, it is an empirical issue how mortality and life expectancy are affected by retirement system changes. Using an unanticipated policy reform that increased retirement opportunities for preretirement workers, our paper presents evidence from the Netherlands that early retirement reduced mortality.
Specifically, in 2005, certain birth cohorts of Dutch civil servants could temporarily qualify for early retirement (ER) at a younger age. This ER window triggered a steep increase in retirement. Using administrative data covering the entire population, we find that induced retirement led to a drop in the probability of men dying within 5 years by 2.6 percentage points. This is a considerably large effect, relative to small mortality rates in the relevant age groups. When we shift the horizon and consider shorter periods over which to measure mortality, we find the largest impact of retirement on survival within the first year.
Identifying the causal impact of retirement on morbidity or mortality is challenging because of selection on health into retirement: the sick may opt to leave the labor force early. We deal with this by instrumenting retirement with the ER window. In addition, we control for year effects and nonlinear age effects. We estimate the impact on the probability of death within 5 years to allow for effects on the progression of disease. Data limitations prevent us from extending the follow-up beyond 5 years.
The quoted effect of 2.6 percentage points is obtained from a model that allows for correlated unobserved individual fixed effects between the decision to retire and the probability to die within 5 years. Among the set of alternative estimates that we provide, this number represents the smallest impact of retirement on mortality with the relatively largest standard errors.
There is a range of related papers that investigate the effect of retirement on health. Many of them provide survey data evidence, but overall, the findings from that literature are inconclusive. Charles (2004) , Coe and Lindeboom (2008) , Neuman (2008) , Zamarro (2011), De Grip et al. (2012) , Insler (2014) , Eibich (2015) , Godard (2016) and Kämpfen and Maurer (2016) all find that retirement has a positive impact on health. Dave et al. (2008) , Kuhn et al. (2010) and Behncke (2012) , conversely, find a negative impact of retirement on health. What is not entirely understood in this literature is the way in which retirement changes morbidity and mortality outcomes. In particular, direct evidence on the mechanisms at work is scarce. Most papers cited above use age or year specific retirement rules and/or institutions that induce retirement. Examples of these rules and institutions are the eligibility age for public pension benefits that are in place for many years, or decreases in the generosity of retirement benefits that are announced years ahead. Retirement could in these cases be anticipated long in advance. Workers may, for instance, adopt more healthy lifestyles once they get to know that they still have to work quite a few years until retirement. They may do so to make themselves physically better able to continue working until retirement. Anticipation may bias the treatment effect towards zero. Our research design relying on a shock to eligibility conditions avoids this in principle.
Our contribution to this literature is fourfold. First, our policy variation delivers a natural experiment that we exploit to construct a strong instrument providing unanticipated variation in the probability to retire. Second, we use administrative data covering the entire population, and thus follow a large number of individuals over a number of years. As the mortality register essentially provides complete and measurement error-free information, we do not need to worry about selective attrition as an alternative reason for not being recorded in the data anymore. Third, the literature has been inconclusive on the direction of the effect of retirement on health and mortality. We add to the literature by providing evidence for a negative effect of retirement on mortality. Fourth, our comprehensive database puts us in a position to split the analysis by cause of death at a very detailed level, and we can thus obtain additional insights into the channels through which the negative effect of retirement on mortality comes about.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional setting, including the policy shift decreasing the ER eligibility age. Section 3 discusses the data and provides insightful descriptives. Section 4 delineates the research design we use to identify the causal effect of retirement on mortality outcomes, and Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
| INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND POLICY CHANGE
We shall focus on targeted incentives to retire early that became available to a group of civil servants in the Netherlands. The Dutch retirement system foresees retirement at the standard age (for both men and women) of 65. Actual average ages of entering retirement have been considerably lower, however, due to the widespread use of ER arrangements in virtually all sectors of the economy.
1
The Dutch pension system rests on three pillars. The first pillar is the public old-age pension, which is financed on a pay-asyou-go basis. The second pillar consists of occupational pensions, which are funded. The third pillar consists of private provisions. We study the period around 2005. At that time, most occupational pension funds offered ER arrangements. The ER programs were made possible because of particular tax incentives that the government allowed. Individual pension funds set their own entry age for ER benefit receipt and stipulated eligibility criteria. For instance, the public sector pension fund offered arrangements for ER as of the ages 61 or 62 onwards. Retirement before reaching the ER eligibility age was financially very unattractive. We use a temporary decrease in the ER eligibility age for civil servants as a source of exogenous variation to estimate the impact of ER on the probability to die within 5 years.
In April 2004, a temporary decrease in the ER eligibility age for civil servants was announced. We refer to this temporary decrease as "the early retirement window" in the sequel. Due to a reorganization of the central government, employers (departments) being part of the central government were allowed to offer certain civil servants additional possibilities for ER in the year 2005. Employers were only allowed to offer ER to their employees if this would prevent the forced layoff (in the wake of reorganizations) of younger civil servants. In practice, this was implemented by offering ER collectively to all workers meeting the age qualification within a department (Dutch Government, 2004 ). This aspect is vital for the internal validity of our identification strategy, because if ER would have been offered selectively to workers with a relatively low or high probability to die within 5 years, for example, the opening of the ER window would be endogenous to mortality. The ER window offered gross retirement benefits that could be up to 70% of workers' average pay (midcareer salary), corresponding to benefit levels in other ER programs.
Civil servants faced several eligibility criteria for entering the ER window (Dutch Government, 2004 , 2005 . First, they had to be at least 55 years old at the moment of ER. Second, they had to have been continuously employed as civil servant during the 10 years prior to ER. Civil servants were also required to have continuously contributed to the public sector pension fund during the 10 years prior to ER. Importantly, these requirements prevent self-selection into the public sector of workers who would like to retire early. Employers had to decide before January 1, 2005, whether or not to open the ER window as of January 1, 2005, and eligible civil servants were not allowed to retire later than December 1, 2005. These stipulations hence meant that retirement decisions were taken rapidly, without delay, a fact that is at the base of our strong first-stage results shown below. Participating civil servants were entitled to ER benefits until the age of 65 with a maximum duration of 8 years. Civil servants aged 57 or older at the moment of ER were thus entitled to retirement benefits for the whole period until normal retirement at age 65. Civil servants born before January 1, 1948, could continue accruing pension claims at a rate of 50% at the expense of the employer for a maximum of 4 years. Civil servants born on or later than January 1, 1948, that is, civil servants who were in the age category 55-57 in 2005, did not have this opportunity. The ER window was thus very attractive for civil servants aged 58 and older, somewhat less attractive for those aged 57 but substantially less attractive for civil servants aged 55 or 56. We therefore differentiate our instrument by age.
| DATA
We use Dutch register data at the population level for the period 2000-2010. The data are administered by Statistics Netherlands. We have access to data on mortality, hospital stays, and job and personal characteristics originating from various administrative sources that can be linked with a personal identifier. The mortality file provides information such as month, year, and primary (and secondary) cause(s) of death. The hospital stay file provides for every hospital stay information such as the start and the end date of the stay, the reason for the stay and where the patient went after being released from the hospital. The job characteristics file provides information on all jobs that any individual has been employed in during [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . For every job, both start and end date, the industry code and the annual wage are available. The personal characteristics file contains information on demographic characteristics such as nationality, marital status, birth year, and birth month. The personal characteristics file also includes a partner identifier that allows us to link partners to each other.
For our analysis, we select observations on male civil servants in the age category 53-60 during [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . 2 We exclude observations on civil servants without a Dutch citizenship during 2000-2005. We also exclude observations for which the relevant civil servant had not been continuously employed as a civil servant for the 10 years prior to January 1st of the year of observation, because such workers were ineligible for the ER window (see Section 2). Observations on workers who stayed in the hospital somewhere between 1999 and retirement are also excluded from our analysis. If observations on hospitalized individuals would not be dropped, this could bias our treatment effect estimate downwards. This is because hospitalized individuals may more likely be induced to retire early due to having bad health and may so have a higher probability to die within 5 years. We also drop observations for retirees for the years after the year they have transitioned into retirement. Observations on individuals that would appear only once in our dataset are dropped as well. We retain about 133,000 observations for our analysis. The upper panel of Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for male civil servants and male workers employed outside the public sector. Age is measured on December 31st of the respective year. The variable married takes value 1 if a worker was married in the year of observation, 0 otherwise.
3 Lagged wage income indicates the total wage income a worker earned in the year prior to the year of observation. Lagged wage income is measured in thousands of deflated Euros with 2000 as the reference year. We only have a limited number of variables at our disposal that we can use as controls. Because of this, the individual fixed effects that we control for in our instrumental variable model are expected to be important in explaining retirement status and the 2 We do not provide similar estimates for women, because the policy change induced too few women to become eligible for retirement benefits and to retire early.
In particular, not many women met the eligibility criterion of having been employed continuously as a civil servant for the 10 years prior to early retirement.
probability to die within 5 years. One might think in the first place of effects due to year of birth, education, or chronic health conditions. In addition, the fixed effects also correct for time-invariant heterogeneity that remains unobserved in administrative data, such as preference parameters determining choices. The lower panel of Table 1 shows that workers in the control group were similar in marital status and lagged wage income to workers in the treatment group. This control group consists of male civil servants aged 53-54 in 2005, that is, those civil servants who could not be offered ER. 4 The treatment group includes male civil servants aged 55-60 in 2005, that is, those civil servants who could be offered ER. For the external validity of our study, it is important to notice that male civil servants in the treatment group were in general comparable, in terms of observables, to male workers employed in other sectors. 5 We do not observe directly on the individual level which civil servants were offered ER. This is no threat to the validity of our approach, because there was no selection in offering ER to workers, as ER was offered to workers collectively rather than individually (see Section 2). We define retirement as being observed to have exited a job and not having started working again before January 1st, 2009. Figure 1 shows for male civil servants that the probability to die within 5 years increased across age for several birth cohorts. There were birth cohorts that followed different patterns as well. Male civil servants who were born relatively long ago had in general a higher probability to die within 5 years than male civil servants with the same age who were born relatively recently.
| METHODOLOGY
We employ an instrumental variable approach to estimate the impact of ER on the probability to die within 5 years within a linear probability model. We instrument the retirement choice using dummy variables for the ages for which civil servants were eligible for entering the ER window, interacted with a dummy variable for the year 2005, that is, the year of the policy change. We use civil servants aged 53 or 54 in 2005 as the control group and civil servants in the age category 55-60 in 2005 as the treatment group. The baseline model controls for individual fixed effects. The treatment effect we estimate has an interpretation of a local average treatment effect (LATE), that is, the effect of ER on the probability to die within 5 years for those who were induced to retire early by variation in the eligibility conditions. 
| Instrument validity
The instruments we use are valid if two conditions are satisfied. First, the instruments have an impact on retirement status. Second, the instruments do not correlate with unobserved factors having an impact on the probability to die within 5 years. The instruments we use are dummies for eligibility for retirement benefits due to the temporary decrease in the ER eligibility age for civil servants in 2005. Figure 2 shows that retirement rates for male civil servants in the age category 58-60 were substantially higher in 2005 than in other years. Retirement rates for male civil servants aged 56 or 57 were higher in 2005 than those in other years as well. Retirement rates for male civil servants aged 53 or 54 were similar in 2005 to those in other years. This is in line with the age-specific incentives provided by the opening of the ER window, as discussed in Section 2, and thus strongly suggests that the policy change induced civil servants to retire early. 6 We do not have reasons to expect that the opening of the ER window had a direct impact on the probability to die within 5 years. To our knowledge, there were no events other than the reform we study that in 2005 or in the 5 years to follow may have shocked the probability to die within 5 years for civil servants aged 55-60 in 2005. We also do not have reasons to expect 6 There were several other pension related policy changes around the period under review. These policy changes, and their possible effects on retirement rates are discussed in the online Appendix. They will not threaten the validity of our approach, however. that our instruments are correlated with unobserved factors that influenced the probability to die within 5 years. Unobserved factors that are expected to have influenced the probability to die within 5 years may include the unobserved level of health, health-related behavior, the number of hours worked, and associated stress levels. If retirement induced by the opening of the ER window had been anticipated by individual workers, the number of hours worked and health-related behavior could be correlated with the policy change. However, the possibility to open the ER window was only announced in April 2004, and employers decided only later in 2004 whether they would open the ER window for their employees. As civil servants were only informed late during 2004 whether they would receive an ER window offer, we do not expect anticipation of ER to be an issue.
Selection into public sector jobs after the announcement of the ER window opening is also not an issue. This is because one of the eligibility criteria for entering the ER window was that civil servants had to have been employed as civil servants continuously during the 10 years prior to ER. Another possible concern is that the jump in retirement rates for civil servants in 2005 was driven by factors other than the opening of the ER window for civil servants in 2005. One of the factors that could have shifted retirement rates at large is a change in disability insurance, but this change was not particular to the public (or the private) sector.
7 Figure 3 shows that retirement rates for male workers aged 55-60 employed outside the public sector were not higher in 2005 than in other years. This indicates that the difference in retirement rates for civil servants aged 55-60 between 2005 and other years was not caused by factors that shifted retirement rates of the entire workforce in 2005.
| Model specification
We estimate the LATE using a two-stage-least-squares approach. In the first stage, retirement status is estimated and, in the second stage, the impact of predicted retirement on the probability to die within 5 years is estimated. In the baseline specification, we control in both stages for time-invariant individual fixed effects that are allowed to be correlated with observed characteristics. The time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity controlled for concerns differences in year of birth, education, and (stable) preferences for leisure, for instance. We also include year fixed effects and nonlinear age effects. The first stage of our model is specified as follows:
where R it is a dummy variable that is 1 if individual i was retired in year t. R it is 0 otherwise. D jt is a year dummy that is 1 for year j and 0 otherwise. A k it indicates the kth term of a third-order age polynomial recentered to 53. E lit is an age dummy that is 1 if individual i reached age l in year t and 0 otherwise. H it − 1 includes lagged wage income, and M it is a dummy variable that is 1 if an individual was married in year t and 0 otherwise. v it is an error term. e i is an individual fixed effect. In principle, the fixed effects specification may reduce the impact of omitted variable bias from time-invariant unobservables, as e i is allowed to be correlated with all covariates.
7 Disability insurance and its relation to early retirement are discussed in the online Appendix. The second stage is specified as follows:
where Y it is a dummy variable that is 1 if individual i died within 5 years after year t and 0 otherwise. ω then has the interpretation of measuring the LATE. α i is again an individual-level fixed effect and allowed to be freely correlated with all covariates as well as with e i from the first stage. The error terms u it and v it are allowed to be correlated as well.
5 | RESULTS
| The uninstrumented case
We instrument retirement status because of the potential endogeneity of retirement status to mortality. For comparison, the first column of Table 2 shows the coefficient estimates for the model as specified in Equation 2 for the case in which retirement status R it is not instrumented. The coefficient estimate on retirement is positive and significant at the one percent level. Retirement is associated with a 0.6 percentage point, or 13.4%, higher probability to die within 5 years. If retirement status would not be endogenous to mortality, we would expect the coefficient estimate on retirement status in this uninstrumented model to be similar to the one in the instrumental variable model.
| Instrumental variable estimates
The other two columns in Table 2 show coefficient estimates of the two stages of our instrumental variable approach. The age-specific instruments in the first stage are all positive and significant, and their impact increases with age, as expected from the institutional incentives described at the end of Section 2. This pattern strongly suggests that the opening of the ER window induced eligible civil servants to retire. The F statistics show that our instruments are relevant at the one percent significance level.
The coefficient of interest in the second stage shows that retirement induced by the ER window opening decreased the probability to die within 5 years by 2.6 percentage points, or 47.1%. For comparison, Kuhn et al. (2010) also find large effects for blue-collar workers, however of the opposite sign. The effect we find is similar in size and sign to the mortality effects due to job loss found by Browning and Heinesen (2012) and Eliason and Storrie (2009) , who report that job loss increases the probability to die within 4 years by, respectively, 36% and 44%. Of course, the events of job loss and postponing retirement may be of a qualitatively very different nature. Interestingly, however, Zamarro (2011) and Insler (2014) find an effect that has the same sign as the effect we find, and they also find, like we do, an effect that runs in the opposite direction when retirement status is not instrumented.
| Causes of death
Specific causes of death may be related to working or being retired. For instance, if working induces high stress levels, the effect of retirement on mortality may run through, amongst others, diseases of the circulatory system. This mechanism would then be revealed by considering mortality rates due to diseases of the circulatory system. To get more insight into the mechanism through which ER affects mortality, we exploit causes-of-death register information. Causes of death are categorized by the 10th Revision of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (World Health Organization, 2010). We estimate the instrumental variable model in Equations 1-2 using a dummy variable for dying within 5 years due to a specific cause as the dependent variable in Equation 2. 8 We thus estimate the probability of dying because of a specific cause, although other causes of death and survival are part of the risk set. We separately estimate the model for each International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems chapter, or, in case of the frequent cancer-related causes of death and diseases of the circulatory system, for each subchapter or block. Chapters counting less than 20 unique fatalities are merged into the chapter "other diseases". Blocks on cancer counting less than 20 unique fatalities are merged into the block "other malignant neoplasms," and blocks on diseases of the circulatory system counting less than 20 unique fatalities are added to the block "other forms of heart disease." Table 3 shows estimated coefficients on retirement for mortality due to any of the specific death causes, and the associated standard errors. If we do not correct for multiple hypothesis testing, the coefficient estimate of retirement on dying within 5 years due to diseases of the arteries, arterioles, and capillaries, and diseases of the digestive system are negative and significant at, respectively, the five and one percent level.
ER decreased the probability to die within 5 years due to diseases of the arteries, arterioles, and capillaries by 0.3 percentage point. Diseases of the arteries, arterioles, and capillaries as causes of death are interesting in the context of this paper, because lifestyle and stress can have a significant impact on the probability of dying from these diseases. Aneurysmal diseases such as aortic dissection and aortic aneurysm are the diseases that cause most fatalities within the block "diseases of the arteries, arterioles, and capillaries." Hypertension and smoking are among the modifiable risk factors for aneurysmal diseases (Suzuki et al., 2003) . Among the risk factors for aneurysmal diseases, hypertension is the most important modifiable risk factor. Risk factors for hypertension include obesity, smoking, alcohol consumption, lack of physical exercise, and stress (Appel et al., 2006; Kaplan and Nunes, 2003; Truelsen et al., 2006) . Most of these risk factors can be affected by retirement.
ER induced by the opening of the ER window negatively affected the probability to die within 5 years due to diseases of the digestive system by 0.7 percentage point. Liver diseases are responsible for most fatalities in the chapter "diseases of the digestive system." Alcohol use and obesity are among the modifiable risk factors for liver diseases (Bellentani et al., 2000; Funnell et al., 1993 ).
When we apply Bonferroni correction for multiple hypotheses testing, none of the coefficients is significant at the ten percent level. This implies that the effects of retirement on cause specific mortality do not differ significantly across causes of death. The lack of statistical significance seems to be at least partly due to limited frequencies of cause-specific fatalities. The small numbers of cause-specific fatalities contributes to coefficient estimates being imprecise and having in some cases values that appear unrealistically high or low. The Bonferroni correction being overly conservative in rejecting null hypotheses may also be a part of the explanation why the retirement coefficient on none of the causes of death is significant.
| Distribution of treatment effects across time horizons
So far, we have focused on the probability to die within 5 years as the outcome variable. Table 4 also shows the estimates for the effect of ER on the probability to die within fewer years. We obtain these estimates by changing the dependent variable and using the same methodology as before. We find that ER decreases the probability to die within 1 year by 92%. This suggests that retirement has an almost immediate effect on mortality. We are actually not the first to find that job departures have a large and almost immediate effect on mortality. In the literature on the effect of job displacement on mortality, Browning and Heinesen (2012) find that job displacement increases the probability to die within 1 year by 84% and Bloemen et al. (2015) find that job displacement increases the probability to die within 1 year by 86%. Again, one may find that job loss is an unhealthier treatment than postponing retirement and may so expect it to have stronger health or mortality effects. Large relative effects such as the one we find may not be that uncommon, because the effects compare to (very) low-base probabilities. Especially when some of the older workers are in poor health, retirement and its associated relief from stress and life style change may help postponing death for some years. If this happens for two out of a hundred civil servants who were induced to retire, that would already explain the size and magnitude of our retirement coefficient estimate on the probability to die within 1 year. The relative effects of retirement on mortality are smaller when the time horizon for mortality is lengthened, as base probabilities increase with age. The differences between the effects of ER on the probabilities to die within 2 and 3 years and 4 and 5 years are negative, indicating that ER has a positive impact on the probability to die during the third year and the fifth year. The change of the sign of the effect of ER on the probability to die in the fifth year may illustrate that the effect of ER on mortality dies out when the time horizon for the probability to die is lengthened. Because all considered workers will die eventually, irrespective of whether they retire or not, the effect of ER on the probability to die within, say, a hundred years, is zero. If the effect of ER on mortality within 4 years is negative, the effect of ER on mortality in at least one of the later years will mechanically have to be positive.
| Robustness checks

| Placebo instruments
The validity of our approach relies on the opening of the ER window for civil servants as an exogenous shifter of retirement rates. As a robustness check, we verify whether the variation in retirement rates of civil servants in the age category 55-60 in 2005 is due to the opening of the ER window and not by another event that occurred in 2005. We estimate an instrumental variable model on a dataset including not only observations on civil servants but using observations on workers employed outside the public sector as well. Except for the criterion on being employed as a civil servant, we apply the same data selection criteria as in the previous analyses. The functional form for the instrumental variable model looks similar as the baseline functional form in Equations 1 and 2. Table 5 lists the control variables and instruments included. The most important deviation from our baseline model is that the instruments here are dummies for the ages 55-60 interacted with a dummy for the year 2005 interacted with a dummy for the worker not being employed as a civil servant. Some control variables are added compared to the baseline functional form as well to control for differences in effects between civil servants and workers employed outside the public sector. Table 5 shows that the coefficient on predicted retirement in the second stage of the model is not significant. The coefficients on the instruments in the first stage show that some of the instruments do significantly affect retirement status of workers employed outside the public sector, both positively and negatively. The coefficients on the instruments are in absolute terms small in size, though. This suggests that the jumps in retirement rates for civil servants are induced by the opening of the ER window rather than a shock that shifted the retirement rates of all workers upwards. The model estimated here controls for lagged wage income, marital status, year fixed effects, nonlinear age effects, and individual fixed effects. Retirement is instrumented with six dummies for the eligibility of ER benefits, that is, dummies for the ages 55-60 interacted with the dummy for the year 2005. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the individual level. *significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level.
5.5.2 | Robustness checks on functional form and model type 5.5.2.1 | Age dummies and nonlinear age and year terms
Our statements concerning the probability to die within 5 years are to be understood conditional on age. Age is an important determinant of both retirement status and the probability to die within 5 years. This may make our result sensitive to the way age enters our model. We control for second and third order age effects in our instrumental variable model. This baseline estimate is redisplayed as variation a in Table 6 . As a robustness check, we estimate the instrumental variable model once controlling for a quadratic age function, and once specifying a fourth-order polynomial in age. Table 6 shows that the LATE estimates for the alternative models are similar to the LATE estimate for the baseline model. This indicates that our instrumental variable result is robust to controlling for age effects of one order lower or one order higher (variations b and c). Our instrumental variable result is robust to controlling for age fixed effects (dummy variables) for the ages 55-60 rather than polynomial age effects (variation d) and polynomial year effects rather than year fixed effects (variation e).
| Wage income (t-1)
We control for lagged wage income in our model. Lagged wage income may capture some of the effects of financial wealth and hours worked on retirement status and the probability to die within 5 years. Table 6 , variation f, shows that our LATE estimate is insensitive to not controlling for lagged wage income.
| Random effects
We estimate the instrumental variable model with random effects to verify whether our baseline is sensitive to imposing the assumption that individual effects are uncorrelated with all covariates. We estimate the random effects instrumental variable model using the specification as in Equations 1 and 2. Table 6 , variation g, shows that the LATE estimated using the random effects model is significant at the five percent level. The magnitude of the effect is very similar to the one of our baseline, however. A Hausman test rejects the random effects specification in favor of the fixed effects. This is consistent with the view that individual effects are correlated with at least some covariates, such as lagged wage income. Workers with a higher wage income in the previous year may have time-invariant characteristics that make them more or less likely to retire or more or less likely to die within 5 years. The model estimated here controls for lagged wage income, marital status, year fixed effects, year fixed effects interacted with a dummy for the worker being employed as a civil servant, nonlinear age effects, and nonlinear age effects interacted with a dummy for the worker being employed outside the public sector. The dataset used here includes observations on workers employed outside the public sector and workers employed as civil servants. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the individual level. *significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level.
| No individual effects
We estimate the instrumental variable model without individual effects to verify how sensitive our result is to not controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Compared to the specification in Equations 1 and 2, we exclude the terms accounting for the individual effects. Instead, we also add dummies for all birth year cohorts except one as independent variables to both Equations 1 and 2. Table 6 , variation h, shows that the LATE estimate without individual fixed effects is in absolute terms a little larger than the one with individual fixed effects and that it is significant at the five percent level. In general, however, all our results are very comparable to the ones presented here when relying on cross-sectional estimators; this statement also extends to the robustness checks displayed in the following subsection. Our dataset includes observations on married and unmarried men. The coefficient estimate on retirement status for this baseline dataset is redisplayed in Table 7 as variation a. Married men may make retirement decisions in a different way than unmarried men. Married men may, for instance, take into account whether their spouses are retired or whether there are grandchildren present. As marital status may affect lifestyle, it may indirectly affect the probability to die within 5 years as well. This may make the coefficients on, for instance, age, in the first and second stages of the instrumental variable model being different for married men than for single men. We check whether differences in coefficients between married and unmarried men affect our LATE estimate. Table 7 , variation b, shows that the coefficient estimate on retirement based on observations for married men only is not significant at the ten percent level.
| Wage income (t-1)
In the baseline, we have not selected observations based on lagged wage income (earnings). It may be that the effect of retirement on mortality is smaller for workers who have low wages than for workers who have higher wages. This may be, for instance, because workers who have higher earnings may work more hours, so that retirement would imply a larger relief from work for these workers than for workers who have lower earnings and work fewer hours. Table 7 , variation c, shows that our result is robust to excluding observations on workers who were paid less than €15,000 during the previous year. Interestingly, the number of observations does not change much if this criterion on lagged wage income is imposed. This may reflect that workers in our dataset, who have a continuous employment tenure of at least 10 years, have a strong labor force attachment.
| Extended control group: workers aged 52-54 in 2005
Our control group consists of civil servants who were either 53 or 54 in 2005. Because we use a fixed effects model, the control group effectively consists of civil servants aged 54 in 2005 only. We include observations on workers aged 52 for all years and extend our control group to workers in the age category 52-54 in 2005 to verify whether our result is not driven by particular characteristics of civil servants aged 54 in 2005. Table 7 , variation d, shows that our result is largely robust to including workers aged 52 in our dataset.
| Extended dataset: hospitalized workers
Ill-health workers may have a higher probability to retire early than healthy workers and may have a higher probability to die within 5 years than healthy workers. We have tried to limit the bias due to the potential endogeneity of retirement status to mortality by dropping observations on workers who have not been hospitalized between 1999 and retirement. We refer to this group of workers as hospitalized workers. Table 7 , variation e, shows that the LATE estimated using observations on hospitalized workers only is much larger in magnitude than the LATE estimated using observations on nonhospitalized workers only. The intuition for this finding is that hospitalized workers have a higher probability to die within 5 years than nonhospitalized workers. This makes hospitalized workers have more room for health improvement during retirement than nonhospitalized workers. Table 7 , variation f, shows that the LATE based on the merged samples of both hospitalized and nonhospitalized workers differs only slightly from the baseline LATE using nonhospitalized workers only.
5.5.3.5 | Extended dataset: workers employed outside the public sector
The dataset used for the estimation of the LATE consists of observations on civil servants only. Our result may depend on civil servant-specific retirement and mortality rates across age and years. As a robustness check, we estimate a modified version of the model using data on civil servants and workers employed outside the public sector, thus enlarging the control group. The model we estimate is the model specified in Equations 1 and 2, except that the instruments, that is, the interactions between the dummy for the year 2005 and the dummies for the ages 55-60, are multiplied by a dummy for being a civil servant. Table 7 , variation g, shows that our LATE estimate is largely robust to correcting for civil servant-specific mortality and retirement patterns. 
| CONCLUSION
We study the impact of early retirement (ER) on mortality. We find that retirement induced by a temporary decrease in the ER eligibility age for civil servants in the Netherlands decreased the probability to die within 5 years for men by 2.6 percentage points. This is a considerably large effect, relative to small mortality rates in the relevant age groups. One possible explanation, consistent with patterns of causes of death, for such an effect is that the relief of stress and change in lifestyle associated with retirement postpone death for some civil servants who did not have a very good health already. Our main result is that ER induced by the decrease in the ER eligibility age has a negative impact on mortality. This result may have some implications for the direction and magnitude of the effect of ER on social welfare. First, retirement positively affects population health. Improvements in population health positively affect population well-being. Second, the positive health effect of retirement may reduce health care costs. Third, as retirement decreases mortality, it enlarges the longevity risk borne by pension funds. Fourth, openings of ER windows as the one studied are costly.
Pension reforms in many countries increase the ER eligibility or normal retirement age. If such changes were to have the opposite effect on mortality of our estimated effect of a reduction in ER eligibility age, one might expect a positive impact on mortality, a positive impact on health costs, and a negative effect on the amounts of pension benefits paid. The net effect of an increase in the ER eligibility age on social welfare is, however, unclear and depends on the magnitudes of the welfare effects of retirement through the four different channels we just discussed.
